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MATTER OF A-B-: A DECISION THAT ABSOLVES THE 
UNITED STATES OF ITS ROLE IN CREATING AND 
PROMOTING VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR 
Yenis Vanesa Argueta Guevara* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2018, then-Attorney General Jefferson Sessions (hereinafter 
“AG”) released Matter of A-B-, a precedential opinion that has a substantial 
effect on asylum cases of people fleeing harm from non-state actors, 
particularly victims of domestic and gang violence.1  The AG employed an 
infrequently used “refer-and-review” provision of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (hereinafter “INA”) that allowed him to certify immigration 
cases from the highest administrative tribunal to himself for review.2  After 
doing so with A-B-, the AG reversed the Immigration Board of Appeals’ 
(hereinafter “Board” or “BIA”) decision and replaced it with his own, which 
is binding on the BIA and immigration courts.3  The opinion narrows the 
path available for victims fleeing domestic and gang violence to seek asylum 
in the United States by placing a high level of doubt on whether they can 
meet the statutory requirements.4  A-B- focuses on “private violence” and to 
what extent people fleeing this type of cruelty, particularly domestic and 
gang violence, can take refuge in the United States.5  
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 1  Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G. 2018). 
 2  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i).  
 3  See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2018) (“The attorney general shall . . . review such 
administrative determinations in immigration proceedings.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(i) 
(“The Board shall be governed . . . by decisions of the Attorney General (through review of a 
decision of the Board, by written order, or by determination and ruling pursuant to section 
103 of the Act).”). 
 4  See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec at 332–40. 
 5  Id. at 317 (“Specifically, I sought briefing on whether, and under what circumstances, 
being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ 
for purposes of an application for asylum or withholding of removal.”). 
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The AG engages in this legal analysis without recognizing the United 
States’ influence in forming and sponsoring this type of violence in El 
Salvador.  Viewed out of that context, the AG is quick to state that victims 
of private violence are generally unable to satisfy the statutory 
requirements.6 
This Comment posits that the United States has a long, extensive 
history of interfering with and promoting violence in El Salvador.  Viewed 
through this lens, Matter of A-B- must be seen as another decision that fails 
to account for the United States’ role in El Salvador’s violent past and 
present.  The second section of this Comment will navigate through the 
United States’ extensive intervention during El Salvador’s Civil War as well 
as its response to Salvadoran asylum-seekers at that time.  The third section 
will delve into U.S. foreign policies in El Salvador after the Civil War.  The 
fourth section will analyze Matter of A-B-.  In that section, this Comment 
will also compare A-B- and the nature of the opinion with asylum policies 
towards Salvadorans during the Civil War.  The last section will propose 
several solutions the United States can adopt to address the crisis it has 
created. 
II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND ASYLUM POLICIES TOWARD EL 
SALVADOR DURING THE SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR 
This Section will focus on the United States’ intervention during the 
Civil War.  Before exploring that time, it is important to understand the lead-
up to the Civil War, which, unsurprisingly, also involved much participation 
from the United States. 
A. Why did the Salvadoran Civil War Happen? 
The divisions and inequalities regarding human rights and living 
standards in El Salvador began with the Spanish conquest, which placed all 
the land in El Salvador with people of European descent and gave next to 
nothing to mestizos or indigenous people.7  The land-owning class continued 
its power through military dictatorships.8  Maximiliano Hernández Martínez 
became the leader of El Salvador through a coup d’état in 1931.9  Hernández 
Martínez’s reign proved bloody immediately after it was established: he 
quashed and instilled fear in the Salvadoran people during the massacre 
 
 6  Id. at 320. 
 7  See History of El Salvador, TEACHING CENTL. AM., https://www.teachingcentral 
america.org/history-of-el-salvador (last visited Apr. 20, 2019). 
 8  See id. 
 9  Stewart W. Fisher, Human Rights in El Salvador and U.S. Foreign Policy, 4 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 1, 4 (1982).   
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known as La Matanza.10  In 1932, El Salvador’s government refused to seat 
elected communists in government.11  The government’s refusal inspired a 
peasant uprising, led by Agustín Farabundo Martí, which prompted a swift 
and brutal response from Hernández Martínez’s regime that killed tens of 
thousands, mostly indigenous Nahuat, of people over the course of several 
weeks.12  The animosity between the military dictators and the peasant class 
of the Salvadoran government did not subside after La Matanza in 1932.  
Approximately 30,000 Salvadorans were killed.13  Although the United 
States initially opposed his regime because of the 1923 Washington 
Treaties,14 the United States later recognized his government in 1934, about 
two years after La Matanza.15  Since the military takeover of Maximiliano 
Hernández Martínez, the “military continued to exercise almost 
uninterrupted control in Salvadoran politics,” and the United States 
continued to provide military and economic aid from the 1940s through the 
Military Assistance Program and then increased the military training through 
the Public Safety Program.16 
The military government of El Salvador maintained its power from 
December 1931 through the Civil War beginning in 1980 using sheer force 
and political dishonesty,17 and the presence of the United States “was not 
only inattentive to the need for social reform . . . but also was a major 
obstacle to such reform.”18  In the 1960’s, the United States began fearing 
Communist uprising in the Americas, so, beginning with President Kennedy, 
it encouraged Latin American countries to pass reforms to maintain the peace 
but, like the presidential administrations before it, maintained a direct line of 
military supply to El Salvador.19  It was important for the United States to 
maintain a stronghold over the Salvadoran government in case there were 
Communist uprisings or any other threats to the region that could negatively 
 
 10  See id. at 5. 
 11  See id.   
 12  RM DeLugan, Commemorating from the Margins of the Nation: El Salvador 1932, 
Indigeneity, and Transnational Belonging, 86 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 965, 966 (2013).   
 13  Carl W. Levander, En El Nombre De Dios–The Sanctuary Movement: Development 
and Potential for First Amendment Protection, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 191, 193 (1986).   
 14   Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States and the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez 
Martinez, 3 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 151, 151 (1971), http://www.jstor.org/stable/156558 (explain 
-ing that the treaty was signed by several Central American countries agreeing to not 
recognize leaders or regimes that were brought into existence through violence or a coup 
d’état in the region and that the United States would base its recognition of the governments 
on this principle).   
 15  See id. at 169–70.   
 16  Levander, supra note 13, at 193.   
 17  Fisher, supra note 9, at 4.   
 18  Fisher, supra note 9, at 26 (citation omitted).   
 19  Fisher, supra note 9, at 26.   
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impact United States’ interests.  During the Nixon and Ford administrations, 
the United States’ encouragement of social reform was largely wishful 
thinking.  Henry Kissinger, who was mostly in charge of foreign policy 
during the Nixon and Ford administrations, consistently found no evidence 
of human rights violations in El Salvador.20  The United States ambassador 
to El Salvador during the Ford administration, Ignacio Lozano, stated “he 
had received little to no help in implementing human rights initiatives.”21  
Throughout his presidency, President Carter attempted to place human rights 
at the forefront of the United States’ policy in El Salvador, but, 
simultaneously, his administration fought to stop social reform before El 
Salvador became another socialist country in Latin America.  The United 
States began to implement policies and laws that could force El Salvador to 
tackle its human rights abuses in the country.22  El Salvador quickly rejected 
military aid from the United States, following an example set by several 
other countries that would be impacted by these laws.23  The United States, 
however, did not yield.24  Shortly thereafter, the repressive government of El 
Salvador began to take steps to reduce the human rights violations occurring 
in the country, but those measures only lasted until the United States 
approved a bank loan.25  In the last year of Carter’s administration, the United 
States abandoned its façade that human rights were at the forefront of its 
foreign policy in El Salvador and, in the process, turned its back on a country 
that was on the brink of a brutal Civil War.  Carter’s administration showed 
that the United States valued stopping the threat of communism over human 
rights.26 
Domestically, El Salvador was a ticking time bomb.  Throughout the 
mid-twentieth century, left-wing guerrillas and the military-controlled 
government continued carrying out death squads to intimidate the other 
side.27  As the clashes between the two groups intensified, violence was 
increasingly aimed at civilians.28  Salvadoran rebels launched a final 
 
 20  Id.   
 21  Fisher, supra note 9, at 27.   
 22  Two sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: section 502B, which would 
prohibit military aid to governments that consistently indulge in patterns of gross violations 
of international human rights, and section 116, which would prohibit economic aid to 
governments guilty of repeated human rights violations; and several 1977 amendments to the 
International Financial Act forcing US lending institutions to vote against loans provided to 
repressive governments. 
 23  Fisher, supra note 9, at 28.   
 24  Id. 
 25  Fisher, supra note 9, at 28–29. 
 26  Fisher, supra note 9, at 33. 
 27  El Salvador, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, https://cja.org/where-we-work/el-
salvador/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
 28  Levander, supra note 13, at 194.   
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offensive to topple the US-supported forces days before Reagan’s 
administration.29  The Carter administration began delivering deadly aid to 
El Salvador in early 1981 to combat the guerrilla’s final offensive.30 
B. Foreign Policy During the Salvadoran Civil War (1979–
1992) 
Reagan viewed the insurgency and uprising in El Salvador as “the place 
to draw the line in the sand against communism.”31  During his presidency, 
the United States held firm that El Salvador should stand as a barrier to 
communist expansion in Latin America32 since it viewed the insurgency in 
El Salvador as part of a larger global network to expand communism.33  The 
United States, and President Reagan directly, believed the country’s 
problems could be solved only through military intervention, completely 
disregarding the basis and background of the rebellion.  Under Reagan, the 
United States supplied massive amounts of money to the Salvadoran 
government to terminate the communist threat in the Americas.  Of the total 
military aid received by El Salvador from the United States during the 1980s, 
roughly sixty percent was financed through the president’s discretionary 
funds, not through congressionally-approved aid.34  Roughly six billion 
dollars in aid went “to defeat a popular-backed insurgency and establish a 
moderate democracy” in Latin America during the war.35  The United States 
armed and trained Salvadoran soldiers, some on United States soil.36 
Both the Salvadoran and United States governments, throughout the 
war, claimed that most of the human rights abuses were being perpetrated by 
the guerrillas, but, although guerrillas were heavily perpetrators of violence 
towards government officials and their families, the rebels did not kill with 
impunity like the Salvadoran government.37  Evidence existed that military 
 
 29  Brian D’Haeseleer, ‘Drawing the line’ in El Salvador: Washington Confronts 
Insurgency in El Salvador, 1979–92, 18 COLD WAR HIST. 131, 131 (2018). 
 30  Levander, supra note 13, at 193.   
 31  Raymond Bonner, America’s Role in El Salvador’s Deterioration, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/trump-and-el-
salvador/550955/. 
 32  D’Haeseleer, supra note 29, at 143. 
 33  Norma Roumie, Gangs and the Culture of Violence in El Salvador (What role did the 
US play?), 5 THE GREAT LAKES J. OF UNDERGRADUATE HIST. 24, 30 (2017). 
 34  Cara E. McKinney, Twelve Years a Terror: U.S. Impact in the 12-Year Civil War in 
El Salvador, 2 INT’L RESEARCHSCAPE J. Art. 5 (2015). 
 35  D’Haeseleer, supra note 29, at 131.  Some estimates put the total amount at $4.5 
billion.  See id. 
 36  Roumie, supra note 33, at 30; McKinney, supra note 34. 
 37  Christine Caldera, The State of El Salvador: Human Rights and Violence in the Post 
War Era (2015) (unpublished A.B. thesis, University of Dayton) (on file with the University 
of Dayton e-Commons multimedia archives). (The Salvadoran government utilized “death 
squads to carry out grave human rights abuses . . . against innocent individuals for denouncing 
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aid was ending up in the hands of corrupt members of the Salvadoran 
military, who participated in terror tactics, yet the United States did not stop 
military funding.38  The United Nations Truth Commission Report confirmed 
“at least 85% of human rights atrocities committed during the war are 
attributable to the Salvadoran military and its security forces.”39  From 1980 
to 1992, over 70,000 people died in the Civil War,40 over 500,000 sought 
asylum in other countries, and tens of thousands were wounded or 
disappeared.41 
1. The Executive’s Response to Salvadoran Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers During the War 
Not only were we supporting these human rights abusers in El 
Salvador, then we were in a way perpetuating a further terror on 
that same population in the United States by depriving them of 
their rights under the law—and trying to send them back to the 
very human rights violators that the United States government was 
supporting. And so that whole systematic violation of the law and 
of human rights was just so profoundly offensive.42 
i. The Carter and Reagan Administrations’ Hard-Pressed Line 
Against Salvadorans Seeking Asylum 
President Carter signed the Refugee Act of 1980 (hereinafter “Refugee 
Act”) on March 17, 1980.43  The Refugee Act adopted the definition of a 
“refugee” from the 1967 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees: 
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality 
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any 
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is 
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
 
the government or suspicion of aligning with the left. Members of death squads in El Salvador 
were members of the military . . . In retaliation, [guerrillas] perpetuated violence against the 
government and army in order to protect innocent rural community members.”). 
 38  Roumie, supra note 33, at 30. 
 39  D’Haeseleer, supra note 29, at 140 (quoting Comm. on the Truth for El Salvador, 
From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador, Report of the Commission on the 
Truth for El Salvador, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993)). 
 40  McKinney, supra note 34.   
 41  Joaquín M. Chávez, An Anatomy of Violence in El Salvador, NACLA (Sept. 25, 2007), 
https://nacla.org/article/anatomy-violence-el-salvador.  
 42  SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, NATIONS OF EMIGRANTS: SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF 
CITIZENSHIP IN EL SALVADOR AND THE UNITED STATES 51 (2007). 
 43  Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
ARGUETA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2019  7:21 PM 
2019] COMMENT 267 
group, or political opinion.44 
The Refugee Act requires an individualized, case-by-case analysis of 
all asylum claims, which differs from pre-Act United States immigration 
law.  Before 1980, federal law was mostly concerned with protecting those 
individuals fleeing communist governments.45  In the Refugee Relief Act of 
1953, Congress specified that “refugees must come from communist or 
communist-dominated countries.”46  The United States viewed refugee 
policy as a means to adopt foreign policy.47  After signing the 1967 Protocol, 
however, the United States was faced with the fact that the Protocol’s 
definition of “refugee” differed from its domestic definition.48  In 1978, 
Congress endeavored for United States law to be in accordance with the 1967 
Protocol, resulting in the Refugee Act.49  The Refugee Act was also enacted 
to end the anti-communist bias in adjudicating asylum claims.50  The 
Refugee Act eliminates nationality, alone, as a qualification for refugee 
status.51  President Carter hailed the Act as “a new admissions policy that 
will permit fair and equitable treatment of refugees in the United States, 
regardless of their country of origin.”52  The Refugee Act was signed and 
implemented as the violence in El Salvador rapidly increased. 
One of the biggest challenges Central Americans faced while seeking 
asylum in the 1980s was the requirement to establish that the violence they 
had experienced in their home land constituted persecution.53  The Reagan 
Administration argued Salvadorans were “economic migrants”—people 
leaving El Salvador for personal gain, not political safe-haven.54  These 
economic migrants, it was argued, were “beyond the legal bounds for federal 
 
 44  Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  
 45  Kenneth D. Brill, The Endless Debate: Refugees Law and Policy and the 1980 Refugee 
Act, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 117, 122 (1983) (“Refugee policy was an ideological weapon in the 
Communist-Free World competition.”). 
 46  Id.; Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203 § 2(a)-(c), 67 Stat. 174 (expired 
1956). 
 47  Brill, supra note 45, at 123. 
 48  Brill, supra note 45, at 124. 
 49  Id.  
 50  Deborah Anker, U.S. Immigration and Asylum Policy: A Brief Historical Perspective, 
13 IN DEF. OF THE ALIEN 74, 74 (1990). 
 51  Stephen Macekura, “For Fear of Persecution”: Displaced Salvadorans and U.S. 
Refugee Policy in the 1980s, 23 J.  POL’Y HIST. 357, 358 (2011). The Refugee Act still 
provides that someone can base an asylum claim on persecution on account of nationality. 
The difference is that a person must now show there is persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution because of that nationality. 
 52  Statement on Signing S. 643 Into Law, 1 PUB. PAPERS 503 (Mar. 18, 1980). 
 53  Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American 
Asylum Seekers, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 574 (2011). 
 54  Macekura, supra note 51, at 358. 
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protection”55 because they did not have a viable fear of persecution in their 
native country.  Economic migrants were ineligible for special treatment 
under United States immigration law.56  This classification as “economic 
immigrants” stemmed from the fact that the Reagan Administration 
supported the Salvadoran government.57  As discussed earlier, the Reagan 
Administration maintained its stance that the rebels, not the government of 
El Salvador, were responsible for human rights violations—a position that 
would be undermined if the United States accepted refugees and asylum 
seekers.58  The legal consequences of the Refugee Act allowed foreign policy 
concerns to dictate an exclusionary refugee policy.59 
The Refugee Act’s goal to end anti-communist bias fell short, which is 
particularly seen in its adjudication of asylum claims from Central America.  
About “90 percent of the refugee admissions from abroad have been from 
communist or communist-dominated countries” and “Central Americans . . . 
[were] ineligible to apply for refugee status outside the United States.”60  
Additionally, between July 1983 and September 1989, the approval rate for 
asylum applications for people from El Salvador was about two percent.61  
The approval rates for people from the U.S.S.R., Romania, and Iran were 
72.6 percent, 70.3 percent, and 61.5 percent, respectively.62 
Another way to receive asylum was through Extended Voluntary 
Departure (hereinafter “EVD”),63 which President Carter first denied in 
1980.  Instead, the Carter Administration deported 12,000 Salvadorans back 
to El Salvador in 1980 alone.64  In 1981, Senator Kennedy implored the State 
Department to consider the violence in El Salvador when adjudicating 
Salvadoran’s asylum claims, including a “blanket voluntary departure,”65 
which had been offered to Ethiopians from May 1977 to November 1981; 
Iranians from April 1979 to November 1980; and Nicaraguans from June 
 
 55  Macekura, supra note 51, at 365. 
 56  William Deane Stanley, Economic Migrants or Refugees from Violence? A Time-
Series Analysis of Salvadoran Migration to the United States, 22 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 132, 
132 (1987). 
 57  Coutin, supra note 53, at 576.  
 58  See supra Part II.B. 
 59  Macekura, supra note 51, at 358. 
 60  Anker, supra note 50, at 80. 
 61  Anker, supra note 50, at 81. 
 62  Anker, supra note 50, at 80–81.   
 63  EVD, now known as Deferred Enforced Departure, refers to an administrative grant 
allowing individuals from certain countries to stay temporarily in the United States until the 
conditions in their home country change. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), Adjudicators Field Manual § 38.2, https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/ 
HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-16606/0-0-0-16764.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 64  Macekura, supra note 51, at 361. 
 65  Brill, supra note 45, at 128. 
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1979 to September 1980.66  The State Department denied the request, 
claiming that the violence in El Salvador had not yet reached the levels of 
violence of other countries and Salvadorans in the United States were not 
solely seeking haven in the United States.67  It is striking that during the time 
EVD was denied, the Reagan Administration sought “congressional 
approval for military assistance to the government of El Salvador by showing 
a fair record on human rights.”68  President Reagan consistently refused to 
extend EVD protection to Salvadorans.69  By 1984, 1.2 million Salvadorans, 
about 25 percent of the Salvadoran population, were displaced from their 
home: 480,000 within the country; 244,000 in Mexico or other countries in 
Central America; and 500,000 in the United States.70 
ii. The Sanctuary Movement 
When the Salvadoran Civil War began, many religious groups and 
human rights organizations mobilized to provide aid to displaced 
Salvadorans.71  In the mid-1980s, congregations were openly defying the 
government by “publicly sponsoring and supporting undocumented 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugee families.”72  Participants in the 
movement transported Central Americans “over the border and across the 
country” and aided by providing legal representation, food, medical care, and 
employment.73  The US government responded by prosecuting eighteen 
activists resulting in mixed verdicts, a conviction, and an acquittal.74 
In 1985, several religious and refugee service organizations and two 
undocumented immigrants sued various government officials, including 
then-Attorney General Richard Thornburgh.  The suit “challenged systemic 
discrimination against Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum-seekers” by the 
United States government.75  Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that 
Salvadorans and Guatemalans were wholly denied asylum.76  About two to 
three percent of asylum cases regarding Salvadoran nationals succeeded 
 
 66  Brill, supra note 45, at 128–29 n.60. 
 67  Brill, supra note 45, at 129–30. 
 68  Brill, supra note 45, at 130. 
 69  Macekura, supra note 51, at 371–72. 
 70  Coutin, supra note 53, at 575–76. 
 71  Macekura supra, note 51, at 369. 
 72  Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-and-
asylum-policy-reagan-era.  
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Carolyn Patty Blum, The Settlement of American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh: 
Landmark Victory for Central American Asylym-Seekers, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 347, 347 
(1991). 
 76  Id.  
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during the eighties.77  Comparatively, the asylum grant for all nationalities 
was about twenty-four percent.78  In 1989, the case was certified as a class-
action that included Salvadorans and Guatemalans that were denied asylum, 
withholding of removal, and EVD.79  Eventually, the case settled.80  
Importantly, the settlement agreement acknowledged that foreign policy and 
nationality are irrelevant in determining “whether an applicant for asylum 
has a well-founded fear of persecution.”81  Counter to Reagan’s entire 
refugee policy, the settlement also stated that it is irrelevant to an individual’s 
asylum claim whether the United States government has “favorable 
relations” with the asylum-seeker’s home country.82  Provided certain 
requirements were met, the settlement provided a de novo asylum 
adjudication for all Salvadorans and Guatemalans that were previously 
denied asylum or those that did not file for asylum.83 
2. Congress Responds to the Refugee Crisis in Late 1980s 
and Early 1990s 
Beginning with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(hereinafter “IRCA”), many of the reforms regarding Salvadoran asylum-
seekers were handled through several Congressional acts.  Since the focus of 
this Comment is refugee policy toward Salvadorans, these acts will be 
evaluated briefly in this section insofar as the acts pertain to Salvadoran 
asylum-seekers. 
i. 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act 
IRCA legalized undocumented immigrants that entered the United 
States before 1982 as long as they (1) proved continuous residence in the 
United States; (2) paid a fine and back taxes; (3) proved they were not guilty 
of any crimes; and (4) had some knowledge of the United States history and 
government and the English language.84  IRCA also imposed sanctions 
against employers that hired immigrants without work authorizations.85  Due 
to the employment requirements after IRCA was passed, asylum applications 
 
 77  Id. at 349; See Anker, supra note 50, at 81. 
 78  Blum, supra 75, at 350 n.18. 
 79  Blum, supra 75, at 352. 
 80  United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, American Baptist Churches v. 
Thornburgh (ABC) Settlement Agreement, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/laws/legal-
settlement-notices/american-baptist-churches-v-thornburgh-abc-settlement-agreement. 
 81  Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603 § 245A(a)(2)–(4), 
100 Stat. 3359, 3394–95 (1986). 
 85  Id. § 274A(a) at 3360.  
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quadrupled to over 100,000.86  Since the Salvadoran economy depended on 
remittances from nationals in the United States, immigrants facing 
unemployment and possible deportation alarmed President José Napoleón 
Duarte, the Salvadoran president from 1984 to 1989.  President Duarte urged 
“President Reagan to give temporary refuge to Salvadorans living illegally 
in [the] country.”87  In a striking turn of events, the United States’ foreign 
policy in El Salvador now benefitted Salvadorans living in the United States.  
President Reagan voiced support for displaced Salvadorans following 
President Duarte’s stance against deportations.88 
ii. The 1990 Immigration Act and Temporary Protected Status 
Congress passed the 1990 Immigration Act (hereinafter “1990 Act”) 
“to respond to humanitarian crises throughout the world.”89  The 1990 Act 
created Temporary Protected Status (hereinafter “TPS”), which allows 
certain noncitizens from designated countries to remain in the United States 
legally with work authorization.90  The 1990 Act designated Salvadorans as 
beneficiaries of TPS.91  As the name states, TPS designation was 
temporary—protection lasted eighteen months, beginning on January 1, 
1991.92  After the eighteen-month period ended, President George H. W. 
Bush granted those Salvadoran beneficiaries with Deferred Enforced 
Departure (DED), “another form of non-statutory blanket relief from 
deportation.”93  DED expired on December 31, 1994, but Salvadorans’ work 
authorization continued as beneficiaries were given the option to apply for 
asylum.94 
TPS was significant in that it “codifie[d], for the first time, criteria and 
procedures for granting entire classes” of noncitizens relief from deportation 
until conditions in their country of origin stabilize.95  TPS also stands in 
contrast to the United States’ asylum policies: TPS was granted to 
Salvadorans because of their nationality.  Asylum protection is granted only 
to individuals, on a case-by-case evaluation, that meet the statutory 
 
 86  Coutin, supra note 53, at 580. 
 87  Robert Pear, Duarte Appeals to Reagan to Let Salvadorans Stay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 
1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/26/world/durate-appeals-to-reagan-to-let-salvador 
ans-stay.html. 
 88  Macekura, supra note 51, at 374. 
 89  Bill Frelick & Barbara Kohnen, Filling the Gap: Temporary Protected Status, 8 J. 
REFUGEE STUD. 339, 339 (1995). 
 90  Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 244A, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030 (1990). 
 91  Id. § 303(a)(1) at 5036.  
 92  Id. § 303(a)(2) at 5036. 
 93  Frelick & Kohnen, supra note 89, at 342. 
 94  Frelick & Kohnen, supra note 89, at 342.  
 95  Peter C. Diamond, Temporary Protected Status Under the Immigration Act of 1990, 
14 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 205, 206 (1992). 
ARGUETA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2019  7:21 PM 
272 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:261 
requirements in the Refugee Act. 
III. UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND ASYLUM POLICIES TOWARD EL 
SALVADOR AFTER THE SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR 
The Salvadoran government and guerrillas entered negotiations to end 
the Civil War in early 1990.96  On January 16, 1992, the two parties signed 
a peace accord, the Chapultepec Peace Agreement, in Mexico City.97  The 
Civil War was officially over. 
Gangs have been one of the biggest sources of violence in El 
Salvador.98  These gangs—and the violence they inevitably create—is what 
drives most Salvadorans to flee their homes.99 
A. Gangs 
Mara Salvatrucha (hereinafter “MS-13”) and Calle 18 (hereinafter 
“18th Street”) are the two most prominent gangs in El Salvador today.100  
These two gangs are associations of networks that, largely, control parts of 
El Salvador and have a vast web of criminal activities.101 
These two gangs were formed in Los Angeles, California: 18th Street 
in the 1960s and MS-13 in the 1980s.102  As Salvadorans migrated to the 
 
 96  Margarita S. Studemeister, El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords, U.S. 
INST. OF PEACE (2001).  
 97  United Nations, General Assembly, The Situation in Central America: Threats to 
International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives, A/46/864 (Jan. 30, 1992) , https://pea 
ceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Chapultepec_Peace_Agreement_16_January_19
92.pdf; Diana Villiers Negroponte, Remembering El Salvador’s Peace Accord: Why Was That 
Peace Elusive?, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/ 
2012/01/19/remembering-el-salvadors-peace-accord-why-was-that-peace-elusive/. 
 98  Life Under Gang Rule in El Salvador, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/el-salvador/life-under-
gang-rule-el-salvador (“The culprit [for the murder rate of 103 per 100,000 inhabitants in 
2017] in most of these murders is the maras (gangs).”) [hereinafter Gang Rule]; Anastasia 
Moloney, Factbook: Six Reasons Why El Salvador Became One of the World’s Murder 
Capitals, REUTERS (May 11, 2016, 12:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-el-
salvador-violence/factbox-six-reasons-why-el-salvador-became-one-of-the-worlds-murder-
capitals-idUSKCN0Y221K (“Gang violence has plagued El Salvador for decades, making the 
Central American country of 6.4 million people, one of the most dangerous outside a war 
zone.”). 
 99  Anna-Catherine Brigida & Heather Giesin, ‘Our country is not a safe place’: why 
Salvadorans will still head for the US, THE GUARDIAN (June 4, 2018, 12:59 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/24/salvadorans-deported-from-us-facing-
violence-fleeing-poverty. 
 100  Gang Rule, supra note 98. 
 101  See id. 
 102  Dara Lind, MS-13, explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.vox.com/ 
policy-and-politics/2018/2/26/16955936/ms-13-trump-immigrants-crime; Don Winslow, 
MS-13 Was Born in the USA, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/ms 
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United States beginning in the mid-twentieth century and during the Civil 
War, immigrants were met with xenophobic rhetoric and labeled as “self-
interested economic migrants.”103  Life in the United States was not easy for 
both documented and undocumented Salvadoran immigrants because the 
group faced “symbolic and structural violence” stemming from the “fear of 
deportation; the exploitation of their work and rights; [ ] and their exclusion 
from socioeconomic resources” that could have provided opportunities of 
upward mobility and incorporation into American society.104  Salvadoran 
immigrants were “accountable” in the eyes of the law, but were not protected 
by it.105  They worked low-paying jobs and held deep feelings of isolation 
from mainstream society.106  For many there was uncertainty as to their legal 
status107 and whether their stay in the United States would end in deportation.  
These conditions laid the foundation for the formation of the gangs, a direct 
response to the United States’ failure to address the needs of the Salvadoran 
immigrants living on its lands.  Gangs originated to fill the void left by the 
lack of an identity, as well as to fit in, in a new and unknown country. 
The government’s response to gangs in the United States was swift.  In 
Los Angeles, gangs were seen as part of the force that fueled the decay of 
urban life and laws were enacted to deport migrants that formed the gangs.108  
Since there was no genuine definition of what gang membership was, law 
enforcement was given substantial discretion, which led to the 
criminalization of innocent and non-gang-affiliated individuals.109  The 
increase in deportations and general criminalization further destabilized El 
Salvador.  Many people who were deported in the 1990s faced difficulty 
reintegrating in El Salvador because the country was devastated by a terrible 
Civil War and many did not have family left in El Salvador.110  The country, 
dealing with a weak infrastructure and a feeble institutional framework, 
 
-13-was-born-in-the-usa; Barrio 18, INSIGHT CRIME, https://www.insightcrime.org/el-
salvador-organized-crime-news/barrio-18-profile-2/ (last updated Feb. 13, 2018). 
 103  Roumie, supra note 33, at 33.  
 104  Id.  
 105  Roumie, supra note 33, at 33–34.  
 106  Roumie, supra note 33, at 34.  See generally Manuel Vasquez, Saving Souls 
Transnationally: Pentecostalism and Gangs in El Salvador and the United States, 
CHRISTIANITY, SOC. CHANGE, & GLOBALIZATION IN THE AMS. 1 (2003).  Many Salvadorans 
were unable to receive state or federal welfare benefits because of their status.  
 107  Mary Kathleen Dingeman-Cerda, ¿Bienvenidos a Casa? Deportation and the Making 
of Home in the U.S.-El Salvador Transnation (2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
California, Irvine).  1980 Refugee Act removed nationality as a criterion to grant asylum and 
since the United States supported the government in El Salvador, it continuously rejected 
claims by refugees escaping the war and those seeking political asylum.  Roumie, supra note 
33, at 32. 
 108  Roumie, supra note 33, at 36. 
 109  Roumie, supra note 33, at 36–37. 
 110  Roumie, supra note 33, at 37–38.   
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could not offer support for deportees.111  Furthermore, deportees were 
deemed threats to Salvadoran national security, which increased 
stigmatization and oppression of deportees.112  Gangs did not build their 
identity in El Salvador around their cultural background; instead, gangs built 
their identity around the opposition of rival gangs.113  The United States 
effectively exported what it saw as a problem to a weakened country. 
El Salvador entered its own war on drugs (Mano Dura and Super Mano 
Dura), largely adopting tactics from the United States, which further 
worsened gang culture in El Salvador.114  Zero tolerance policies in El 
Salvador had the opposite effect of their purported purpose: they fostered 
institutionalized gangs instead of combating them, continued to marginalize 
youth, created distrust in the government, and increased the inmate 
population in prisons.115  The use of violence to defeat gangs actually 
supported their efforts to recruit other youth; gangs occupied the safe-space 
that the government could not by consoling youth that felt demonized and 
persecuted by the state.116  In fact, criminal organizations spread quickly in 
response to unsuccessful “U.S. anti-crime policies in the 1980s that were 
later adopted in Central America.”117  The United States’ involvement in 
combatting gangs in El Salvador was not passive, but instead encompassed 
“a large degree [of involvement] prompted by police building efforts 
sponsored by US organizations as well as through interrelated activities of 
American embassies.”118 
More recently, a CNN report accused the United States of “quietly 
fund[ing] and equip[ing] elite paramilitary police officers in El Salvador” 
accused of extrajudicial killings of alleged gang members.119  The police unit 
Special Reaction Forces (FES) killed 43 suspected gang members.120  This 
 
 111  Roumie, supra note 33, at 38.  
 112  Id.  
 113  Roumie, supra note 33, at 40. 
 114  Danielle Mackey & Cora Currier, El Salvador Is Trying to Stop Gang Violence. But 
the Trump Administration Keeps Pushing Failed “Iron Fist” Policing, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 
2, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/10/02/el-salvador-gang-violence-prevention/ (“As the 
gangs grew in size and power, successive Salvadoran governments reacted with mano dura, 
doing so with the full backing of the United States.”). 
 115  Roumie, supra note 33, at 41–42. 
 116  Id.  
 117  Jose Miguel Cruz, Central American Gangs Like MS-13 Were Born Out of Failed 
Anti-Crime Policies, THE CONVERSATION (May 8, 2017), https://theconversation.com/central-
american-gangs-like-ms-13-were-born-out-of-failed-anti-crime-policies-76554. 
 118  Roumie, supra note 33, at 43. 
 119  Nick Paton Walsh et al., US-Funded Police Linked to Illegal Executions in El 
Salvador, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/05/world/el-salvador-police-intl/ 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
 120  Id. 
ARGUETA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2019  7:21 PM 
2019] COMMENT 275 
unit received significant funding from the United States.121  Although FES 
has been disbanded, many of its officers joined a new unit that continues to 
receive funding from the United States.122  Similar to the United States’ past 
actions regarding Salvadoran gang members, the United States funded 
money to FES officers—who were shooting people dead in the streets of El 
Salvador—and deported thousands of MS-13 recruits.123  The report 
categorized this level of violence as a “culture of lawlessness in El 
Salvador,” in which police officers actively engage in conversations to 
discuss how to hide extrajudicial killings.124  The United States claims it 
takes “allegations of extrajudicial killings extremely seriously,”125 and units 
receiving United States aid must show there is a fundamental respect for 
human rights.126  These extrajudicial killings have prompted comparisons to 
the Civil War in El Salvador when government soldiers killed civilians with 
impunity.127  A woman whose son was murdered by the police claims life 
now is “like during the [civil] war, they’re killing young people but talking 
about it can get you killed as well.”128  The United States’ commitment to 
human rights and vetting of units falls short, a common trend in its affairs 
with El Salvador.  The Salvadoran police is receiving attention for its 
treatment of gang members, but one should not overlook the United States’ 
role. 
B. Trade Deals and Other Salvadoran Policies 
The United States’ interference leading to El Salvador’s destabilization 
also includes influence in trade deals.  Although this Comment focuses on 
domestic and gang violence, economic destabilization is important to 
understand the extent to which the United States continues to weaken El 
Salvador.   
After the Salvadoran Civil War, the United States “endorsed a 
neoliberal economic reconstructionist plan in El Salvador,” which led to 
“increased foreign investment, privatization of public infrastructure[,] and 
 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id.  In one of these instances, an officer disparages other officers for beating someone 
before killing him.  In his opinion, this would undermine their story that the gang member 
was killed in a shootout. 
 125  Paton Walsh, supra note 119 (quoting a spokesperson for the United States embassy). 
 126  Id.   
 127  Nina Lakhani, ‘We Fear Soldiers More Than Gangsters’: El Salvador’s ‘Iron Fist’ 
Policy Turns Deadly, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/world/2017/feb/06/el-salvador-gangs-police-violence-distrito-italia. 
 128  Id. (alteration in original). 
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lack of investment in public programs.”129  This neoliberal policy failed to 
consider the issues that led to the Civil War in the first place and instead 
adopted methods that would benefit the United States. 
The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(hereinafter “CAFTA-DR”) is a trade agreement between the United States 
and several Central American countries130 and the Dominican Republic.131  
The CAFTA-DR “promotes stronger trade and investment ties, prosperity, 
and stability throughout”132 Central America and the Dominican Republic as 
well as along the southern border of the United States.  Before El Salvador 
entered the agreement, many Salvadorans protested the deal, claiming it was 
an “unfair, anti-democratic agreement that will only serve the interests of 
U.S.-based multinational corporations.”133  CAFTA-DR ensures Central 
American countries and the Dominican Republic are dependent on the 
United States because of “massive trade imbalances and the influx of 
American agricultural and industrial goods that weaken domestic 
industries.”134  The tariff reduction model in CAFTA-DR creates impossible 
conditions for domestically grown/produced products to compete with 
imports.  Critics of free-trade deals, including CAFTA-DR, claim these type 
of agreements undermine democracy in Latin America and that the United 
States continues its control over these countries “through commercial 
exploitation and political coercion.”135  CAFTA-DR was hailed as a way to 
curb violence and poverty in Central America.136  Since it was enacted in 
2004, it has done close to nothing to deter violence and decrease poverty, but 
it does allow employers to exploit workers and avoid providing fair working 
 
 129  Roumie, supra note 33, at 30. 
 130  These countries include Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua. 
 131  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central 
America FTA), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-
republic-central-america-fta (last accessed Nov. 3, 2018). 
 132  Id.   
 133  Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), Major 
Mobilizations in El Salvador to Protest CAFTA and Honor Schafik Handal, (Feb. 1, 2006), 
http://cispes.org/blog/major-mobilizations-in-el-salvador-to-protest-cafta-and-honor-
schafik-handal?language=es). 
 134  Mark Tseng-Putterman, A Century of U.S. Intervention Created the Immigration 
Crisis, MEDIUM (June 20, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/timeline-us-intervention-
central-america-a9bea9ebc148. 
 135  Michelle Chen, How US ‘Free Trade’ Policies Created the Central American 
Migration Crisis, THE NATION (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-us-
free-trade-policies-created-central-american-migration-crisis/. 
 136  Héctor Perla Jr., The Impact of CAFTA: Drugs, Gangs, and Immigration, TELESUR 
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/The-Impact-of-CAFTA-Drugs-
Gangs-and-Immigration-20160301-0008.html. 
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practices.137 
IV. MATTER OF A-B-: REVERTING TO THE 1980S UNITED STATES 
REFUGEE POLICY TOWARDS SALVADORANS 
The Refugee Act defines a refugee as a person who is “unable or 
unwilling to return to” her home country “because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”138  An 
applicant seeking asylum must meet all the requirements in the statute to be 
eligible for asylum.  The INA does not define “membership in a particular 
social group.”139 The BIA first defined a particular social group (hereinafter 
“PSG”) in Matter of Acosta as “a group of persons all of whom share a 
common, immutable characteristic.”140  Such characteristic must be one that 
the individuals in the group cannot change or should not have to change 
because it would violate their fundamental identities or consciences.141  The 
BIA gave several examples of traits that constitute immutable 
characteristics, including “sex, color, kinship ties, . . . former military 
leadership or land ownership.”142 
In Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, the Board defined two 
additional elements, three in total, to establish membership in a PSG: (1) the 
group is composed of members that share a common, immutable 
characteristic; (2) the group must be defined with particularity; and (3) the 
group must be socially distinct from the society the refugee is trying to 
escape.143  In determining whether a PSG meets those requirements, the 
applicants must submit “evidence that the proposed group exists in the 
society in question.”144  This evidence can include “country conditions 
reports, expert witness testimony, press accounts of discriminatory laws and 
policies, historical animosities,” and other evidence that may show the group 
is distinct.145 
The BIA thereafter decided Matter of A-R-C-G-.  Ms. ARCG was a 
woman fleeing domestic violence in Guatemala.146  Her husband repeatedly 
 
 137  Id. 
 138  8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(A)(42)(A) (2018). 
 139  Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 318 (A.G. 2018). 
 140  Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 144  M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244. 
 145  Id. 
 146  Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014). 
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beat her.147  Ms. ARCG sought help from the police multiple times, but they 
told her they would not interfere in her marriage or domestic disputes.148  Ms. 
ARCG fled Guatemala to escape her abuser.149  In her asylum claim, Ms. 
ARCG sought to establish that she was persecuted on account of her 
membership to the PSG “composed of ‘married women in Guatemala who 
are unable to leave their relationship.’”150  The Immigration Judge found that 
Ms. ARCG did not meet the requirements for asylum on the basis that she 
did not prove “she had suffered past persecution or [had] a well-founded fear 
of future persecution” due to her membership in the PSG “married women 
in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”151  After an 
immigration judge denied her asylum, Ms. ARCG successfully appealed to 
the BIA.152  The BIA made clear that PSG’s must be considered in light of 
the evidence and context presented regarding those circumstances in the 
case.153  It recognized that the immutable characteristic of Ms. ARCG was 
her gender and that marital status can also be an immutable characteristic if 
the asylum-seeker could not leave the relationship.154 
A. Matter of A-B-: Case Law Analysis 
Matter of A-B- is a decision in response to A-R-C-G. As in A-R-C-G-, 
the respondent in A-B- fled her country to escape her partner, who abused 
her for years. 
1. Factual Background 
Ms. AB fled El Salvador after enduring approximately fifteen years of 
“relentless physical, sexual, and emotional abuse” at the hands of her 
husband.155  Ms. AB was beaten repeatedly, even while she was pregnant.156  
The extent of Ms. AB’s abuse included her partner bashing her head against 
the wall and/or kicking her.157  Her husband frequently raped her.158  Ms. 
AB’s partner would sometimes hold a knife to her neck or threaten “to hang 
 
 147  Id.  
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. at 389. 
 151  Id. 
 152  A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. at 388–89. 
 153  Id. at 392. 
 154  Id. at 392–93. 
 155  Respondent’s Opening Brief at 3, In The Matter of: [Redacted], Matter of A-B-, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 316, 321 (A.G. 2018) [hereinafter AB Brief], https://uchastings.app.box.com/s/ 
tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291241595459. 
 156  She has three children with her husband.  AB Brief, supra note 155, at 2–3. 
 157  AB Brief, supra note 155, at 3. 
 158  Id.  
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her from the ceiling by a rope.”159  Her husband constantly insulted, isolated, 
and humiliated her.160  Her children were not shielded from her husband’s 
abuse, as he would “also beat their children in front of her.”161 
The Salvadoran government did close to nothing to protect Ms. AB.  
She was granted two restraining orders, but the police did not enforce 
them.162  Although the police arrested Ms. AB’s husband for threatening her 
with a gun, he was released a few days later.163  After she was threatened 
with a knife, the police explicitly told Ms. AB they could not help her, but 
encouraged her to “get out of here.”164 
2. Procedural Background 
Ms. AB arrived in the United States and requested asylum on the 
grounds that she suffered persecution on account of her membership in a 
particular social group: “El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their 
domestic relationships where they [the two partners] have children in 
common.”165  The immigration judge166  denied asylum to Ms. AB because 
he concluded she (1) was not credible; (2) did not belong to a qualifying 
particular social group; (3) did not establish that membership to that 
particular social group, if the group were acceptable under the INA, was 
central in her persecution; and (4) did not “show that the Salvadoran  
government was unable or unwilling to help her.”167  On appeal, the BIA 
overruled the immigration judge’s decision, relying on Matter of A-R-C-G, 
and ordered the immigration judge grant Ms. AB asylum.168  The BIA found 
Ms. AB (1) credible; (2) was member of a particular social group 
substantially similar to Matter of A-R-C-G- (“married women in Guatemala 
who are unable to leave their relationship”); (3) could not leave her husband; 
and (4) the Salvadoran  government was unable and unwilling to protect 
her.169  Following Ms. AB’s completion of background checks, as the BIA 
directed in order to proceed with the asylum claim, Judge Couch “refused to 
 
 159  Id. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Id. 
 162  AB Brief, supra note 155, at 4. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 326 (A.G. 2018). 
 166  Immigration Judge V. Stuart Couch has a “long history . . . of denying asylum to 
domestic violence survivors.”  Backgrounder and Briefing on Matter of A-B-, CTR. FOR 
GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/matter-b/backgrounder-and-briefing-
matter-b (last updated August 2018). 
 167  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. 
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issue a new decision in the case.”170  The AG then certified the case to 
himself for disposition.171  The issue was “whether, and under what 
circumstances, being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a 
cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for 
asylum or withholding of removal.”172 
3. The Attorney General’s Decision 
The decision in A-B- formally overrules A-R-C-G-.  As described 
above, A-R-C-G- held that, “[d]epending on the facts and evidence of an 
individual case, ‘married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their 
relationship’ can constitute a cognizable particular social group.”173  The 
case gave women fleeing domestic violence greater hope in receiving asylum 
based on the abuse suffered in their home.  Ms. ARCG’s case had many 
similar elements to Ms. AB’s case: her husband beat and raped her, her 
husband repeatedly threatened to kill her, and the police refused to help or 
intervene in Ms. AB’s marriage.174  In the decision, the AG affirms asylum-
seekers hoping to establish persecution because of a membership to a PSG 
must show (1) membership to a group, in which members share an 
immutable characteristic, the group is defined with particularity, and the 
group is socially distinct from society; (2) membership to the group is central 
to the asylum-seeker’s persecution; and (3) if the perpetrator is not affiliated 
to the government, the home government is unable or unwilling to protect 
the asylum-seeker.175  In overruling A-R-C-G-, the AG criticized the Board 
for incorrectly applying its own precedents and “because it recognized an 
expansive new category of particular social groups based on private 
violence.”176  Furthermore, A-B- stated that for a PSG to be cognizable, it 
“must ‘exist independently’ of the harm asserted in an application for 
asylum.”177  In contrast, the AG believed, A-R-C-G- recognized a group that 
was defined circularly by its harm.178 
Most of the AG’s damaging remarks were dicta.  He made broad 
generalizations of claims by domestic violence victims and those that were 
victims of private action in stating they would normally not qualify for 
 
 170  Backgrounder & Briefing on Matter of A-B-, supra note 166. 
 171  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 323. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 174  Id. at 389. 
 175  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320. 
 176  Id. at 319. 
 177  Id. at 334 (emphasis in original) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 
236 n.11 (B.I.A. 2014)). 
 178  Id. at 334–35. 
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asylum.179  He further claimed that there may be “exceptional circumstances” 
when victims of private actions could meet the requirements to be granted 
asylum.180  Additionally, the AG was unclear about the role the government 
had to play to establish it failed to protect the asylum seeker.  He made 
remarks that the asylum-seeker must establish the perpetrator’s actions “can 
be attributed to the government,”181 which has not been a standard applicable 
in the past or even in the Refugee Act itself: government must be “unable or 
unwilling” to provide protection to the asylum seeker.182  The AG stated: the 
government’s protection must be “so lacking” that the harm itself may be 
attributed to the government.183  The American Immigration Lawyers 
Association has categorized this decision as a clear statement by the AG to 
close asylum claims on domestic violence victims as well as people fleeing 
gang violence.184  One thing is clear: this decision creates another burden for 
people fleeing violence and seeking to take refuge in the United States. 
B. Coming Full Circle: Matter of A-B- as Another Attempt to 
Wholly Deny Asylum to Salvadorans 
Salvadorans fleeing violence during the Civil War had the burden of 
overcoming the label of “economic migrants.”185  Their motives were 
questioned and the violence they fled was almost an afterthought in 
adjudicating asylum claims.  A-B- has a similar rationale except the reason 
for exclusion is that the alleged persecution is not perpetrated by the right 
actors.  Although the AG’s arguments are largely dicta, his words are 
carefully selected to ensure that victims fleeing domestic and gang violence, 
which are two of the central reasons people flee El Salvador, have significant 
roadblocks in obtaining asylum.  The result is the same as it was in the 1980s: 
these specific people, because of the violence they flee, are not eligible for 
asylum.  The AG’s generalizations and overbroad statements deny asylum-
seekers the right to individualized claim adjudication, which were staples of 
the Reagan administration’s adjudication of asylum claims. 
The United States turned a blind eye to victims of atrocious violence 
during the Salvadoran Civil War.  The United States not only minimized its 
own effects but also rationalized it by creating the idea that asylum-seekers 
were economic migrants.  Today, the United States remains a significant 
 
 179  Id. at 320. 
 180  Id. at 317. 
 181  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317. 
 182  Id. 
 183  Id. 
 184  American Immigration Lawyers Association, Practice Alert: AG Sessions Issues 
Matter of A-B-, Overruling Matter of A-R-C-G- (July 10, 2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/ 
call-feedback-impact-matter-of-a-b—decision. 
 185  See supra Part II.B.1. 
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factor in the conditions that have led Salvadorans to flee their homeland, 
including creating and exporting gangs and engaging in trade deals that 
greatly disfavor El Salvador.186  In adjudicating asylum claims, adjudicators 
need to consider the conditions of the asylum-seeker’s native country.  A-B- 
overlooks the systemic and rampant violence that women experience in El 
Salvador.  By framing the issue as one of private action and actors, the AG 
discards the role the United States had in creating a society of violence in El 
Salvador.  As described above, the United States has been complicit or 
actively engaged in the violent present and past of El Salvador.  A-B- isolated 
the issue of domestic violence as one of private action and failed to account 
for a society that accepts violence due to the United States influence.  As one 
commentator has put it, “[i]f I were one of these [domestic violence] victims 
or if I had to face the Salvadoran system and society, I would have most 
likely left the country.”187  The AG also dismissed Ms. AB’s claims that the 
government would not help her overcome the violence she faced in the hands 
of her husband.  Police officers in El Salvador are ambivalent to violence 
even though they are tasked with protecting people.188  As explained above, 
many officers are even accused of extrajudicial killings.189 
V. ACTING ON THE CURRENT REFUGEE CRISIS: HOW THE UNITED 
STATES SHOULD RESPOND 
People in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the three countries 
are usually called the “Northern Triangle”) are leaving their homelands in 
droves due to the unprecedented level of crime and violence in the Northern 
Triangle, “raising parallels with the exodus of Guatemalans and Salvadorans 
fleeing the civil wars of their respective countries during the 1980s.”190  The 
United States can use several avenues to take responsibility for its role in 
causing this wave of violence, which began before the Salvadoran Civil War 
and continues to this day.  This Comment highlights two different 
possibilities: (1) a formal apology and (2) overruling Matter of A-B- and 
recognizing gender and gang-related asylum claims. 
 
 
 186  See supra Part III.C. 
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 188  See Azam Ahmed, “They Will Have to Answer to Us”, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/magazine/el-salvador-police-battle-gangs.html 
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 189   Paton Walsh, supra note 119. 
 190  Jonathan T. Hiskey, et al., Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime Victimization, US 
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REV. 429, 430 (2018). 
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A. A Formal Apology 
National apologies represent a great deal: apologies accept the blame 
for a certain wrong and recognize the suffering of its victims.191  One 
poignant example of a formal apology comes from President Reagan.  The 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988 recognized that “a grave injustice was done to 
both citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry by the 
evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II.”192  
This Act also “[apologized] on behalf of the people of the United States for 
the evacuation, relocation, and internment of such citizens and permanent 
resident aliens.”193  Before President Reagan signed the Act, he said, “We 
gather here today to right a grave wrong . . . for here, we admit a wrong; 
here, we reaffirm our commitment as a nation to equal justice under the 
law.”194 
The first step in apologizing is accepting there is a reason to apologize.  
Importantly, an apology condemns past behavior.  The United States played 
a significant role in destabilizing El Salvador during much of the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries.195  An apology would formally condemn this 
behavior.  Secondly, an apology commits to better actions in the future.  In 
this case, the United States would commit to engage in better relations with 
El Salvador and its people, specifically those Salvadorans that have been 
directly affected by its policies.  This includes persons fleeing generalized 
and institutionalized violence because that is exactly the violence the United 
States created.  Instead of waiting years, decades, or even centuries to 
apologize for this wrong, the United States should do so now because it is at 
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B. Overruling Matter of A-B- and Recognizing Gender and 
Gang-Related Asylum Claims 
Matter of A-B- contains damaging dicta that places the success of 
domestic and gang violence related claims in a high-level of doubt.197  A-B- 
should be formally overruled.  First, asylum law should recognize that the 
primary motives for domestic and gang violence are not personal disputes.  
The underlying reason of domestic violence in El Salvador is gender and 
subordination.198  The underlying reason of gang-based violence in El 
Salvador is a system allowing gangs to act as the de facto government.199  
Countless country conditions reports show the Salvadoran government is 
unable or unwilling to protect persons persecuted on account of their gender 
or lack of gang affiliation.200  Perpetrators of violence toward women in 
domestic relationships or those that refuse to join gangs are doing it because 
of their identities and opinions. 
In the broadest terms, A-B states that those fleeing domestic and gang 
violence are unlikely to meet the statutory requirements because private 
actors are the persecutors.  This is flawed reasoning because it views 
domestic and gang-based violence in a vacuum.  Domestic violence flows 
from a national belief that women are lesser than, and therefore subject to 
the whims of, men.  In fact, gender-based violence in El Salvador is so 
common that it is tolerated and considered normal.201  During the Salvadoran 
Civil War, government forces engaged in extreme sexual brutality, including 
mass rapes.202  This trend continues today as women in El Salvador are 
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murdered and subject to other types of brutality at alarming rates.203  Women 
are not being attacked because of a private dispute between them and their 
persecutors, instead they are being persecuted because they are women, used 
as political pawns between warring gangs, and seen as a class of individuals 
to be dominated by men.  By the very nature of their persecution, gender 
alone should satisfy the requirements of a cognizable particular social group. 
On the other hand, gang-based violence, specifically the resistance of 
young Salvadoran men to join these criminal organizations or those that have 
renounced their membership, should serve as basis for asylum.  The basic 
premise for this proposal is that these groups inherently meet the “particular 
social group” requirements, but gangs are also the de facto government in 
most, if not all, of El Salvador. 
These two groups meet the common, immutable characteristic 
requirement204 because its members are joined by nationality, often age, and 
past experiences,205 namely resistance to and denouncement of gangs.  The 
two proposed groups also meet the particularity requirement because its 
boundaries are defined to include only those that explicitly and with 
evidentiary proof have resisted gangs or denounced their membership.  The 
simple fact that there may be a large population that falls into this group 
should not be a factor in determining whether it is in fact particular.  Lastly, 
the social distinction requirement is met because El Salvador is highly 
premised on rumors and word-of-mouth, where individuals that resist gang 
violence are known and continuously punished in public.  As much as many 
would not like for this to be true, gang members form a part of Salvadoran 
society and are aware of individuals that resist their recruiting or general 
efforts.  Therefore, gangs perceive these young men as a group to terrorize 
because of their innate characteristics. 
As mentioned earlier, gangs are the rulers of the streets and lives of 
individuals living in their territories.  Gangs are active in 94% of El 
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Salvador’s 262 municipalities.206  In these municipalities, “gangs are . . . a 
standing danger to public safety [and the] de facto authority that exerts 
tremendous control over residents’ daily lives.”207  Gangs strictly limit the 
freedom of intra-country movement.208  They do not permit individuals 
living in another gang’s areas to enter their territory.209  The outskirts of a 
gang’s territory contains check points, and those seeking entry must present 
“government-issued identification cards (containing their addresses) to 
determine their residence.”210  Living in a rival gang’s territory can have 
drastic consequences at these checkpoints because Salvadorans risk “being 
killed, beaten, or not allowed to enter the territory.”211 
In sum, domestic and gang-violence should not be characterized as 
private disputes between two individuals but instead need to be seen in the 
background of El Salvador’s current state of politics. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Statistics show that El Salvador is one of the most violent countries in 
the world—the most violent country not currently at war.212  Regardless of 
this horrific label, asylum policies have not adequately responded to this 
humanitarian crisis.  A-B- is one more brick in the wall of exclusion that is 
attempting to keep out these individuals.  More importantly, the country 
creating this wall has contributed significantly to the circumstances causing 
people in El Salvador to flee their homes.  In torts, law students are taught 
that if someone, call him A, puts another, call her B, in a perilous situation, 
A has an affirmative duty to come to help B.213  This affirmative duty is a 
legal obligation because of the nature of the harm: B would not be in that 
situation but for A’s act.  Salvadoran asylum-seekers should not pay the price 
for the dangerous consequences of the United States’ continuous 
intervention and promotion of violence.  Although El Salvador’s violence 
has many roots, the United States’ role cannot be denied or undermined.  For 
the reasons set out in this Comment, the United States must act to protect 
these individuals because the United States is inextricably linked to reason 
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Salvadoran s are fleeing.  And just as in torts, the United States should have 
an affirmative duty to help those, in whatever means necessary, it has put in 
a perilous situation.  For Salvadorans, refugee and asylum policies are the 
place to start. 
 
